Estimating the financial value of pain informs issues as diverse as the market price of analgesics, the cost-effectiveness of clinical treatments, compensation for injury, and the response to public hazards. Such costs are assumed to reflect a stable trade-off between relief of discomfort and money. Here, using an auction-based health market experiment, we show the price people pay for relief of pain is strongly determined by the local context of the market, determined either by recent intensities of pain, or their immediately disposable income, but not overall wealth. The absence of a stable valuation metric suggests that the dynamic behaviour of health markets is not predictable from the static behaviour of individuals. We conclude that the results follow the dynamics of habit formation models of economic theory, and as such, the study provides the first scientific basis for this type of preference modelling. 
1
For example, Boyce et al. (1992) asked people to value a houseplant (Norfolk pine with a retail value of $6) by offering willingness-to-pay to buy the tree, or willingness-to-accept to sell it, otherwise the experimenter was going to kill it. In this design, the price anchor was the existing retail price. The participants were not told the price, but they could have guessed it or known it in advance. Also, such trees are common commodity with many substitutes in the market. electric shocks and money on a probabilistic basis. The study was approved by The National
Hospital for Neurology and Neurosurgery and Institute of Neurology joint ethics committee
Design. The sequence of activity within each trial of the training and experimental session is illustrated in Figure 1 , which also shows an example of the displays that appeared on participants" screens during a typical trial. Our experiment had the following design characteristics. a) Trial-based payment. On each trial, the participant is given a fixed endowment amount to spend on analgesia, which was not transferable to the next trial. Whatever was left from each trial is kept in the participant's pocket and the total payment for participation in the experiment is based on the accumulated money over all experimental trials (i.e., the money not spent on pain relief).
b) Willingness-to-Pay method. On each trial, the participant experienced one pulse of the electric shock. Thus, we provided the participants with a sample of the experience before they made subsequent decisions. Consequently, they entered the pricing phase of the experiment with full information about the experience they are evaluating. Next, participants had to state what is the maximum amount that he/she was willing to pay in order to avoid 15 pulses of the same shock intensity/magnitude. An offer was marked as a location on a visual scale, using a cursor operated by two keys on the keyboard, one to move it to the left and another to the right. On each trial the initial position of the cursor was randomly located on the scale. The process then continued to determine the market price. c) Auction-based valuation. After the participant stated his/her maximum value, we used a second-price auction design (a standard incentive-compatible preference elicitation procedure proposed by Becker, Degroot, and Marschak (1964) , in order to determine how much the participant had to pay. Thus, on each trial the computer would randomly pick a price from a uniform distribution ranging from 0p to 40p, or 0p to 80p, depending on the condition. The distribution was displayed on the screen in the form of a roulette wheel. If the computer's price was higher than the participant's price, the participant would experience the pain. If the computer's price was lower than the participant's price, the participant would pay this (computer generated) price and avoid the pain. We informed the participants that the spinning wheel ("wheel-of-fortune") determines the market price completely randomly, and therefore, the market price does not depend on the intensity of the electric shock, and does not depend on the offered price. Participants were told that this procedure ensures that the best strategy is to pick the maximum price they would be willing to pay in order to avoid the pain, not a few pennies more and not a few pennies less. We used the following argument to justify this claim: "Thus, it is in your best interest to offer a number that accurately reflects how you value the pain from the electric shock. If you write down a number that is higher than your personal valuation of the pain, then you may end up paying more than you feel it is worth to avoid the shocks. On the other hand, if you write down a number that is lower than your personal valuation of the pain, then you may end up suffering the pain, even though you would have been willing to pay a price to avoid it. Therefore, there is no "right" or "wrong" value to enter on the offer screen; rather it is a matter of offering a value which truly reflects your own valuation of the pain from the electric shock."
Procedure. Each session consisted of three parts, a thresholding procedure, a training session of 5 rounds without payment, and an experimental session consisting of a series of 60 trials for real money. In each trial of the training and experimental session, participants received one or more electric shocks. The order of stimuli (shocks) was randomized individually for each participant. Shocks were delivered using a Digitimer DS3 electrical stimulator through silver chloride surface electrodes placed 2-4 cm apart on the dorsum of the left hand. Each shock consisted of a 1 second duration train of monophasic pulses of 10ms duration at 10Hz. During their session, individuals were sitting in front of a computer, observed a computer screen, and used two key on the keyboard to submit their decisions. The software package, COGENT 2000 (FIL, UCL), was used for stimulus presentation and response acquisition. At the end of the task, participants were fully debriefed and thanked for their participation, and given an opportunity to make any comments.
At the beginning of the session, following consent from each participant, he/she underwent a standard pain thresholding procedure. The purpose of this procedure was to control for heterogeneity of skin resistance between participants and to administer a range of potentially painful stimuli in an ethical manner. In particular, to determine the pain levels to use in the task, as in previous experiments (Seymour et al., 2004 (Seymour et al., , 2005 , participants experienced incremental intensities of current, during which the give simple visual analogue ratings on a 0-10 scale (with the ends of the scale anchored with the verbal desriptors as follows: "0" = "not painful; and 10 = "worst imaginable pain", with participants effectively rating along a continuous monotonic scale between these points). This is done several times, starting off with very mild intensities, to familiarize participants with the set-up. When tolerance is reached, we then estimate the current-to-rating response curve, by statistically fitting a weibull (sigmoid) function, to a short series of randomised sub-tolerance probe stimuli. The current intensities that relate to three levels of pain (mild 4/10, moderate 6/10, strong 8/10) were estimated from this function, which corresponded to the three shock levels (Low, Medium, and High) used in the experiment. Although the stimulation is necessarily within the painful range, electrical stimulation is safe, and does not cause any significant side-effects. It has been used extensively in the past in human experiments, and many times in our lab. Note that general variation in subjective ratings of electrical (and indeed other forms of) pain are easily sufficient to mask the fact that the pain fell into three levels, and, as confirmed by postexperiment questioning, participants assumed an even distribution.
Results
Valuations. We observed higher price offers for medium pain relief when experienced in a sequence of trials in which there were many low pain trials (Low-Medium block), compared to when the same pain was experienced in a sequence in which there were many high pain trials (Medium-High block). That is, participants were willing to pay more to avoid the same pain when that pain was relatively more painful, rather than relatively less painful, compared to recent trials. This effect was evident for both the 40p endowment condition, t (17) = 5.68, p < 0.001, and the 80p endowment condition, t(17) = 3.82, p = 0.001. Thus, what we observed was consistent with a relative valuation of medium over high or low intensity stimuli, as illustrated in Figure 2a and Figure 2b .
To further explore this relativity in valuation, we tested for a rescaling as a function of endowment (40p vs. 80p) between groups. We found that higher offers were given when high endowment was received and vice versa (note price scale on y-axis in Figure 2a ). For example, in comparison to the 40p endowment group, there were significantly higher price offers for medium shocks in both the Low-Medium, t(34) = 4.05, p < 0.001, and MediumHigh, t(34) = 2.79, p = 0.01, contexts in the 80p endowment group. To a good approximation, if people have twice as much endowment in a trial, they are willing to pay twice as much to avoid the same pain. Thus, the "exchange rate" between money and pain is extremely flexible with respect to the endowment. Figure 2c plots the change in difference between the average price offer for medium pain in the Low-Medium and Medium-High blocks. As expected, in each type of block, the difference between prices is initially small, but diverges as a function of experience within the block: the positive slope of the regression line was significant for both the low 40p (b = 0.96, t(9) = 2.86, p = 0.02) and 80p (b = 1.73, t(9) = 5.41, p = 0.001) endowment conditions. To frame our results within economic theory (in terms of what is known as comparative statics), we next plotted the estimated consumer demand curves for pain relief (presented in Figure 3a-c) . To make the data relevant to chronically experienced pain, and also to economic theories of consumption, we included only the trials which followed experienced long (15 shocks) long pain (not just the single example shocks) on the previous trial (i.e., we included only trials following consumed pain). These curves are constructed directly from our data, and address two questions: the first is related to how much pain relief would have been bought by our participants, at different prices, given their stated willingness to pay, and the second question is related to the consequences of increases in income.
Presuming medication is a "normal good", the standard assumptions in health economics is that demand functions are downward sloping and shift rightward with income (in our case, this is the endowment: 40p vs. 80p). In this respect, our findings are in accordance with these assumptions, as shown in Figure 3 . However, note that finding income effects in our laboratory setting is still puzzling, for the income received during the experiment is tiny relative to the participant"s total income (in-lab plus outside money). This finding is, however, well known---a large literature in experimental economics has been spent on studying the so called adaptive encoding phenomena (also known as narrow framing), for instance in the context of risk aversion (e.g., Barberis, Huang, & Thaler, 2006) : economic problems are not put in their wider context, but only within the narrow situation at hand, because the brain"s limited resources are allocated so as to discriminate better among more likely (i.e., recent) outcomes (Tobler, Fiorillo, & Schultz, 2005) . Therefore, we conclude that our income effect is yet more evidence for adaptive encoding.
There was also a significantly higher potential demand for medium pain (Figure 3b) when paired with low rather than high pain, which applies both for both the 40p, X 2 (7) = 24.7, p < 0.001, and 80p cash endowments, X 2 (15) = 32.7, p = 0.01. These results imply that the demand to avoid the medium pain was substantially affected by whether the previous pain was higher or lower (as in Figure 2 ), which suggests that consumer demand estimated from real markets do not necessarily always reveal stable underlying preferences (assumed by some normative decision theories). These effects can be explained by looking at how economics deals with problems involving dynamics: changes in prices and quantities over time (as opposite to the comparative statics mentioned earlier). The conclusions depend crucially on how demand is modelled. Since the early 1970s, habit has become an important component of modelling preferences. Such models assume that the overall level of satisfaction derived from a given level of consumption depends, not only on the current consumption level itself, but also on how it compares to some benchmark reference level, which is an internal criterion based on the individual"s own past consumption levels (Osborn, 1988) . A simple approach is to model habit by making the utility of time t consumption c(t) depend on past consumption Keeping income the same, we need to determine whether the value of (i) getting out of medium pain when just experiencing low pain (and hence, c l ) is higher than that of (ii) getting out of medium pain when just experiencing high pain (and hence, c h ). Mathematically ) and the utility function (u) is strictly concave, it follows that (i) is more valuable than (ii), and hence, the demand curve for avoiding medium pain when experiencing low pain is higher than that of avoiding medium pain when experiencing high pain. The demand curves in Figure 3b do satisfy this as the "vs. low" curve lie to the right of the "vs.
c(t-1): utility = u(c(t)-c(t-1)), where u is some standard, monotonically increasing utility function which is strictly concave (meaning that the slope of the curve decreases as its argument, the change in consumption c(t)-c(t-1), increases). That is, utility depends on the
high" curve for both 40p and 80p endowments, which is what the theory predicts. An analogous analysis predicts that the demand curves for low pain and high pain (in Figures 3a   and 3c ) should follow similar pattern: for low pain, the "vs. medium" curves should be to right of the "vs. high" curves as they indeed are in Figure 3a ; and similarly for high pain, the "vs. low" curve should be to the right of the "vs. medium" one as is indeed the case in Figure   3c . Note also that the gradual increase in the difference between the offer prices (LowMedium vs. Medium-High) in Figure 2c is consistent with habit formation (which also happens gradually), because, as the demand curve analysis demonstrated, avoiding medium pain in the context of low pain is more valuable than in the high pain context. In summary, the demand curve analysis presented here clearly supports the habit based interpretation of the overall results presented in this article.
Discussion
The impact of cash endowment magnitude on each trial is consistent with the idea that people will spend roughly a constant fraction of their experimental income on pain relief.
However, this behaviour implies that people cannot integrate their behaviour in the experiment with their finances outside the experiment. After all, whatever the experimental conditions, the value of money received in the experiment has the same value, when spent later outside the experimental setting. Nevertheless, to provide a tighter control for such budget issues, we conducted a second experiment using a within-participant design where we made the 40p-80p difference vary randomly between trials for the same participants (in all other aspects the design was identical to the original experiment). This second experiment replicated all our original results and thus confirmed our paradoxical result that the "exchange rejects the hypothesis of time separable preferences. There is no much documented experimental work on habit formation in health economics, however. As such, the findings of this article are providing the first solid experimental evidence in favour of introducing habit in preference modelling. Our habit-based analysis also suggests that principles underlying pain judgments may be based on relative judgments unlike other judgment models like the rangefrequency theory (Parducci, 1965 (Parducci, , 1995 , which assume long-term representations.
Our results do not necessarily imply that the brain does not have stable representations of pain, but they do suggest that it cannot readily translate such representations into monetary terms. However, although the neurophysiological basis of aversive valuation is complex (Dayan & Seymour, 2008) , there is evidence that such relativistic effects may indeed exist at an underlying biological level. Neurophysiological recordings in both monkeys and humans both have shown evidence of relative reward coding in neural substrates (for instance, via dopamine projections to the striatum and the orbitofrontal cortex) strongly implicated in simple choice behaviour (Nieuwenhuis et al., 2005; Tobler, Fiorillo, & Schultz, 2005; Tremblay & Schultz, 1999) , suggesting that value relativity may exist at a more fundamental level in the brain.
Explicit judgments concerning pain, and other subjective experiences, are typically expressed in complex social and economic contexts. This is the case, firstly, when we are forced to make abstract comparisons between experienced or imagined primary affective states and secondary rewarding ones, such as money. Furthermore, a particular difficulty in equating such diverse quantities to control purchasing behaviour is generated by the fact that health products are naturally inhibitory, in that one pays to avoid a certain aversive symptom, rather than to receive a positive good. That the products of effective health purchase embody the positively valenced property of relief has interesting parallels with the phenomenon of avoidance studied in animal learning theory, in which states that are associated with omission or termination of otherwise aversive events acquire, through inhibitory processes, rewarding valence (Dinsmoor, 2001; Rescorla, 1969; Morris, 1975; Seymour et al., 2005; Weisman & Litner, 1969; ) . Whereas increasing experience might mitigate this, it cannot easily do so for products which buy relief for never-experienced symptoms, a central "commodity" in modern preventative healthcare markets.
Explicit judgements are also required when economists and policy makers quantify trial, participants first saw the financial endowment for that trial, followed by a single exemplar painful electric shock, of an either low, medium or high intensity. Participants were not informed, nor did they identify, that the pain consisted only 3 discrete levels. They then selected the maximum price they we prepared to pay to avoid 15 further shocks. The maximum price they could offer was their full endowment, which was given on a strictly trial by trial basis (such that there is no sense that endowments could be "saved" or carried over to pay for later pain relief). The market price was set randomly between zero and the full endowment amount, and if this was lower than the participant"s price offer, the 15 painful stimuli were omitted at the cost of the market price (and not the participant"s offer). (b)
Grouping of trials (pain levels) into Low-Medium, High-Medium and Low-High blocks. We repeated each block twice so there were 6 blocks and 60 trials in total. The order of pain levels within each group was randomised, as was the overall order of the blocks. 
